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Regardless of the announced topic and regardless of the occasion upon which it is being announced, it seems fashionable nowadays for every speaker to begin his performance by solemnly
reminding his listeners that they are living in an age of transition.
In order to be sure of complying with that custom, I have inserted
the word "transition" into the title for this occasion. Otherwise,
I was afraid I might forget to mention it, and that might be an
unpardonable sin.
Not only is the emphasis upon transition or change the current
fashion, but I have a strong suspicion that it has always been the
fashion. If we had a tape recording of what transpired between
Adam and Eve as they were making their exit from the Garden
of Eden, my guess is that somewhere along the way we would see
Eve looking up at Adam and saying, "Adam, old chap, I think we
are entering an age of transition."
In spite of that often repeated cliche, the truth is that we must
always wait until tomorrow before we can be sure whether we are
really in a period of transition today. But even now we can be
sure that the New York law of trusts and estates has been in a state
of transition for the past twenty-five years. The changes that have
taken place within that period have been simply breath-taking in
their dimensions. This fact can be demonstrated by taking a
broad view of some of the more conspicuous estate planning problems of twenty-five years ago and seeing how obsolete many of
them have since become.
At that time, New York property owners were burdened with
a type of worthier title doctrine that made most attempts at trust
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revocation an exercise in futility, a two-lives rule calculated to
discriminate against settlors who were so careless as to have more
than two children, a compulsory spendthrift trust statute that
made the very idea of trusts a thing to be feared, and a rule against
accumulations that deprived New York residents of certain income tax advantages readily available to citizens of other parts of
the country. These and many other rules existing in 1949 have
been so modified that they are scarcely believable to the young
people entering the practice of law in the Empire State in 1974.
The transition did not come through any one sweeping reform or statutory enactment. Although most of it has been accomplished through legislative means, it has been through a
step-by-step process whose very gradualness has tended to conceal
the gravity of the events taking place until they were already
accomplished.
I shall not attempt to discuss more than a few of the significant
developments that have occurred within the period covered. To
do so within the time allotted would be impossible. In fact, standing before this audience that includes so many who have had so
much to do with the reforms of the past twenty-five years, I would
feel inadequate for the occasion regardless of how much time I
had. I am in a position that is directly opposite to that of a certain
lecturer who had a habit of beginning every address by admitting
that there were lots of people in the world who knew more about
the assigned topic than he did. He would then take a quick glance
around the room and add, "But since none of those fellows are
here, I shall begin." My problem is that there are lots of people
who know more about my topic than I do, and they are just about
all here. Beginning with that handicap, my purpose is to select a
few particular areas and see if any uniform pattern or consistent
policy goals can be seen. Is there a golden thread running through
the seemingly unrelated changes that have taken place? I might
as well say at the outset that it is my belief that such a common
thread does exist, and it is my hope that a faint ray of light may
be cast upon that thread. If such a thread does exist, and if it can
be seen, even through a glass darkly, the hoped-for result is that
we can catch some slight vision of the work yet to be done.
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If you were to turn the pages of history back to December 12,
1949, and inquire what New York trusts and estates lawyers were
talking about at that time, I dare say that the Burchell and Worm
cases would rate pretty high on everyone's list. These two cases,
In re Burchell's Estate and Worm v. U.S. Trust Company, had
been consolidated by the Court of Appeals and disposed of in a
single opinion on July 19, 1949.1 When that opinion came down,
there were quite a few people, including at least one judge of the
Court of Appeals, 2 who seemed to believe the world would never
be the same again. The reverberations from that opinion echoed
through the law offices of New York for several months and literally set in motion the legislative history of the period now under
discussion.
And now, twenty-five years later, who remembers, or who even
cares, what the Burchell and Worm cases were about? Each of the
two cases involved a settlor who had made an inter vivos transfer
of certain assets to a trustee to pay income to the settlor for life,
remainder to such persons as the settlor should by will appoint,
and in default of appointment to the settlor's next of kin. In one
case the settlor attempted to revoke the trust within his lifetime.
In the other the settlor died without attempting to revoke and
without exercising the testamentary power of appointment. His
next of kin claimed as remaindermen, not as reversioners.
Thus it was that the question of law to be determined in each
case was the same. Did the settlor, by the inter vivos transfer, create any interest of any kind in his own next of kin or did he not?
And the answer to that question depended upon the operation of
a relic of ancient learning known as the worthier title doctrine,
or as it has been more accurately described, the rule of worthier
title. That rule was a simple prohibition against a property
owner's creating an interest, by either deed or will, in his own
heirs. While that rule was of ancient origin, its application is as
current as last week's effort to escape the effects of an estate tax
statute. In its essence, that is exactly what the rule was about. It
was a rule of judicial origin designed to prevent tax avoidance.
The most burdensome form of estate tax during that early period of our legal history consisted of certain feudal dues paid to
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the superior lord. Since the crown was the ultimate lord, the feudal dues were relied upon by the crown as a primary source of
revenue. Somewhere along the way somebody got the idea of
avoiding that form of tax by making some kind of inter vivos
conveyance by which he could retain a life interest in himself and
create a future interest in his own heirs. The hoped for result was
that the heirs would then take as purchasers, not as heirs, and
thereby avoid paying any death taxes. What appeared to be a
rather neat arrangement was frustrated when the common law
judges construed the scheme as nothing more than an effort by
the taxpayer to retain a reversion in himself which would still
pass to his heirs by inheritance and would therefore be subject to
the death tax.
This result soon hardened into an absolute rule of law which
no expression of intent could overcome. As a rule of law, it meant
that no attempt to create a remainder in the heirs of the transferor
would be given effect for any purpose. Presumably this was the
state of the common law of England as it was received into the
New World, including New York. And presumably this was the
state of the law when the case of Doctor v. Hughes3 came before
the Court of Appeals in 1919. Involved was a conveyance of real
estate to a trustee in trust to pay a fixed annual sum from the
rental income to the transferor for life, and on the death of the
transferor to convey the premises to his heirs. The conveyor's two
daughters were, for the time being, his prospective heirs. While
the conveyor was still alive, a judgment creditor of one of the
daughters sought to levy upon the daughter's interest in the real
estate in satisfaction of the judgment. Application of the rule of
worthier title as a rule of law would dictate that the daughter had
no interest. The provision for conveyance to the conveyor's heirs
would be treated as a provision for a reversion in the conveyor.
The court so held, but in doing so Judge Cardozo, speaking for
the court, added a bit of dicta to the effect that he was not sure
whether the rule of worthier title still operated in its absolute
form. He then justified his decision on the theory that the rule of
worthier title still operated in New York at least to such an extent
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that to create a remainder in the heirs of the conveyor, the intent
to do so "must be clearly expressed."4
It seemed strange that such dicta should come at a time when
remainders to unascertained, and even unborn, persons were
freely recognized in New York. 5 More specifically, a property
owner was free to create remainders in the heirs of identified living persons other than himself any time he chose.6 In spite of all
this, the Cardozo dictum laid down the proposition that some
kind of unusual manifestation of intent was necessary to create a
remainder in the conveyor's own heirs. The intent to do so must
"be clearly expressed."
About a decade later, in the case of Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co.,7 a settlor conveyed certain personal property to a trustee in trust to pay income to two successive life tenants. Upon the
death of the survivor of the two life tenants, the principal was to
go to the settlor if living, and if the settlor should then be dead,
to such persons as the settlor should by will appoint, and in default of appointment to the settlor's heirs. After the death of one
of the life tenants, the settlor and the surviving life tenant joined
in an action to terminate the trust under the terms of the familiar
statute giving a settlor a power to revoke a trust upon "the written
'8
consent of all persons beneficially interested."
Since the settlor had the consent of the only life beneficiary, it
was clear that he had all consents necessary if there were no remaindermen. It was equally clear that the only possible remaindermen were the heirs of the settlor. In Doctor v. Hughes it had
been held that an attempted remainder to the heirs of the grantor
was nothing more than a provision for a reversion in the grantor.
If that case should be followed in Whittemore, the settlor would

have a reversion and there would be no remaindermen to worry
about. The settlor could revoke the trust at his own election. But
there was that haunting dictum from the Hughes case that a remainder to the heirs of the settlor could be created if the intent
to do so were clearly expressed. As the court searched for a clear
expression of intent to create a remainder in the Whittemore trust,
they reasoned that if the settlor had intended a reversion only, he
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would have known that he could dispose of that reversion by any
means by which property could be lawfully transferred. If he had
intended a remainder to his heirs, he would have known that such
a remainder would be beyond his control unless he retained in
himself some peculiar or unique means of exercising that control.
In the Whittemore trust that peculiar or unique means was found
in the retention of a testmentary power in the settlor. The reservation of a power to appoint in a particular manner (in this instance by will and not by deed) was taken as a clear indication of
an intent to create a remainder in the settlor's heirs. Since the
heirs had a remainder, and since their identity could not be ascertained within the settlor's lifetime, the consent of such heirs to
the revocation of the trust could not be obtained prior to his
death. Therefore, the trust was irrevocable even though the whole
world joined in a petition for its revocation.
The Whittemore opinion gave express approval to the Cardozo
dictum that in order to create a remainder in the heirs of the
settlor, the intent to do so must be clearly expressed. But the
Whittemore opinion went further and held that that clear expression of intent could be found in a provision no more substantial than the reservation of a testamentary power of appointment.
The courts of New York followed that position with a surprising
degree of consistency for the next two decades." In spite of this
fact, judicial opinions through that period were widely criticized
and were often characterized as being arbitrary and unpredictable. Identical language purporting to create interests in the settlor's heirs was sometimes construed to create remainders and
sometimes reversions. Tempers ran high. The court seemed to be
at war with itself. It gave verbal expression to a requirement that,
in order to be effective, the intent to create a remainder in one's
own heirs had to be clearly expressed; at the same time it was finding that clear expression upon evidence that the bar's rank-andfile considered of little significance and almost fortuitous.
Although litigation concerning attempted remainders to the
heirs of the transferor could arise upon questions concerning
creditors' rights, tax matters, rights of a surviving spouse, and
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many others, the bulk of the attention during that period between 1929 and 1949 was centered around petitions by settlors
to terminate their own inter vivos trusts. In that situation, each
time a remainder to the heirs of the settlor was found, the petition
to revoke was denied; and the property was left tied up in an irrevocable trust.
Such was the state of affairs in 1949 when the Burchell and
Worm cases were decided. Both Worm and Burchell fell into the
classic pattern of a life estate in the settlor, remainder to such
persons as the settlor should by will appoint, and in default of appointment to the settlor's next of kin. Both cases were decided in
strict compliance with the line of authority running back to Whittemore. The presence of the testamentary power of appointment
was regarded as sufficient evidence of an intent to create a remainder in the next of kin. The presence of that remainder prevented the settlor from revoking the trust within his lifetime. It
also dictated that if the power was not exercised, the remaindermen would receive the corpus as purchasers.
The one thing that was new in the Burchell-Worm combinaation was an admission by the court that the rule it had been
applying for the finding of remainders ever since the Cardozo
dictum was announced had been less strict in its application than
the language used would seem to indicate. This was true, but such
an admission by the court resulted in more confusion than clarification. One member of the court provided a vigorous dissenting
opinion in which he invited the legislature to try its hand at the
clarification project.
The legislature tried. A statute was enacted. But the provisions
of that statute came as a surprise to just about everyone. What
was enacted was an amendment to the existing trust revocation
statute under which a settlor was authorized to revoke an inter
vivos trust if he had the written consent of all persons beneficially
interested. The amendment provided that, "For the purposes of
this section, a gift or limitation

. . .

in favor of a class of persons

described only as heirs or next of kin or distributees of the creator
of the trust, or by other words of like import," did not create any
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beneficial interest in such persons.' 0 The effect of the statute was
that the worthier title doctrine was restored to its medieval position as an absolute rule of law at least for this one purpose. After
the amendment, it was impossible for a settlor to create an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his own heirs. But what about
other purposes? What happened if a conveyor attempted to make
a present transfer to his heirs or next of kin, and thereafter a case
arose involving tax questions or the rights of the settlor's creditors, subsequent transferees, or surviving spouse? As to all these
questions, the New York law was left in the same state of hopeless
confusion where it had been since Judge Cardozo announced his
dictum transforming the rule from one of law to one of construction. For all these purposes, it was still possible to create a remainder in one's own heirs, but the legal presumption was against
it; therefore, the intent to do so had to be clearly expressed." In
1966 even that presumption was removed. 12 This left New York
in the peculiar position of having enacted legislation specifically
restoring a bit of medieval dogma for one purpose and having expressly abolished that same dogma for all other purposes.
Strange as these contradictory positions might appear, it is submitted that they have their own reasonably rational justification.
It is also submitted that that justification will define the policy
goals that have dictated the trend in trusts and estates law during
the past twenty-five years.
What is meant by the worthier title doctrine anyway? Simply
stated, it is a rule against the creation of an interest in one's own
heirs. Its reason for being is centered around the doctrine of seisin
and the avoidance of feudal dues. But both seisin and feudal dues
are obsolete concepts. Does the worthier title doctrine have any
place in the industrialized society of present-day New York? By
nullifying all attempts to create interests in the heirs of the transferor, it avoids that means of tying up property. It tends to promote economic mobility. Economic mobility is more essential to
an industrialized community than it was to the agrarian society of
Lord Coke. And if the preservation of the worthier title doctrine
in any form is to be justified, it must be justified on that basis.
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Now let's look at the record. How did the cases involving the
worthier title doctrine between 1919 and 1949 arise? The great
bulk of the litigation within that period concerned the efforts of
settlors to revoke inter vivos trusts. If the settlor's heirs had an
interest, there could be no revocation; if the heirs did not have
any interest, revocation was allowed. The outcome depended
upon the application of the worthier title doctrine. So long as its
application or non-application was a matter of construction, there
was always room for uncertainty. Predictability was difficult. The
market place was demanding economic mobility. The legislature
responded by providing that for this purpose the doctrine would
be made absolute. Economic mobility would have been furthered
even more if the legislation had extended to all purposes. But no
serious problem had arisen except in the area of trust revocation.
The legislature addressed itself to that problem and that problem
only.
The statute is helpful, but it is doubtful if even the trust revocation problem is completely solved. As previously indicated, a literal application of the statute makes it impossible for a settlor to
create an inter vivos, irrevocable trust in favor of his own heirs.
Although that was the intended purpose of the statute and is currently assumed to be the result, there is a fair possibility that the
ingenious draftsman who diligently searches for a way to avoid
that result might succeed. Suppose a settlor really does want an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his own heirs. Could he achieve
that purpose, even after the statute, by making a transfer in favor
of those who for all practical purposes will be heirs but who are
not heirs in the technical sense? What about a limitation to such
persons as would have been the settlor's heirs if the settlor had
died one week before he actually died? And there are numerous
other possibilities. The fact that these possibilities have not been
tried thus far does not alter the likelihood of their being tried at
some future date.
In spite of the legislative policy in favor of economic mobility,
it is doubtful if a restriction on the creation of interests in the
heirs of the transferor is the best way to accomplish that goal.
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There are too many possible escape routes available to the careful
draftsman. It is suggested that the time is right for the legislature
to try again. And if it does try again, a direct attack upon the very
concept of an indestructible trust might prove to be a better
approach.
In any event, the 1951 legislation concerning the creation of
interests in the heirs of the transferor did affirm a legislative policy in favor of economic mobility, and that policy has become the
hallmark of the legislative development during the two decades
that followed. A short step toward greater mobility had been
taken a year earlier when the statutory standard for trust investments was modified.
Any indestructible trust under any circumstances has some
tendency to tie up property and to hinder the normal market flow
of economic assets. At best, the trustee is restricted in the kind of
investments he can make. Prior to 195o that restriction was especially severe under the statutory legal list requirement. Not
only was the trustee frustrated in his efforts to earn a satisfactory
income for his beneficiaries; the market itself was being frustrated
by having large amounts of needed capital withheld from corporate investment. The 1950 legislation brought some relief by extending to the trustee power to invest up to 35% of the trust assets
outside the legal list so long as the investment complied with the
requirements of the prudent-man rule. 13 That percentage was in14
creased to 50% in 1965, and loo% in 197o.
The transition from the legal list requirement to the prudentman rule accomplished at least two purposes. It gave the trustee a
wider range of choice in the selection of investments, thereby enabling him to tailor each portfolio more to the particular needs
of particular beneficiaries. It also released a quantity of accumulated capital for investment in corporate enterprises, thereby contributing toward the industrial development of society as a whole.
Such an enlargement in investment powers is by its very nature
an enhancement in economic mobility.
But even the trustee's freedom to invest in corporate stocks does
not mean that assets being held in trust are completely free or
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completely mobile. The trustee is still confined to established
enterprises whose favorable dividend records have already been
demonstrated. He cannot invest in new or untried ventures. But
there is no such thing as a business enterprise that was not at one
time new and untried. Risk was involved in bringing every business venture into existence. But trust assets are never available for
use as risk capital. And if new industries are to be developed and
if new products are to come on the market, high risk capital must
be supplied by somebody. There is no suggestion here, and so far
as I know nobody has suggested, that trustees should be permitted
to speculate. But somebody must speculate or else further industrial development will cease.
If venture capital is to be available, it must come from people
who own absolute interests, not people who are holding title for
the benefit of others. But when property is held in an indestructible spendthrift trust, there is no absolute interest in anyone.
Ownership is divided between the trustee and the beneficiary.
The trustee is restricted in the kind of investments he can make.
The beneficiary is restricted in that he can neither terminate the
trust nor transfer his interest in it. He has a limited kind of benefit from his wealth but he has neither the control of nor the responsibility for that wealth.
This restriction upon the beneficiary's power to control was
never a problem under the common law of trusts as it developed
in the mother country where neither the spendthrift trust nor the
indestructible trust were ever recognized. If John Settlor conveyed property, whether real or personal, to a trustee to pay
income to Albert for life with remainder to Ben, Albert could
further convey his right to receive income any time he chose to
do so. Ben could do the same with his remainder. Either or both
of these transfers could take place while the trust continued undisturbed. 15 If instead of conveying their respective interests, both
Albert and Ben were desirous of terminating the trust and claiming their beneficial interests as absolute owners, they could do
that.' 6 They did it on the theory that they were the sole beneficial
owners; and that if all beneficiaries, that is to say all persons bene-
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ficially interested, joined in a petition to terminate the trust,
there was no one with standing to object. This freedom of each
beneficiary to sell or give away his individual interest, as well as
the freedom of all beneficiaries to join hands and terminate the
trust, continued to exist without regard to any contrary provisions in the trust instrument. If the settlor had disposed of his
entire interest, he was no longer beneficially interested; therefore,
he was without standing to object to the actions of persons who
were beneficially interested.
But suppose we move that same trust to the United States. Let
it still be a trust to pay income to Albert for life with a duty upon
the trustee to transfer the corpus to Ben upon Albert's death. In
this simple illustration Albert has an equitable life estate, Ben
has an equitable remainder, and the two of them together own
the entire beneficial interest. The settlor owns nothing. And if
the settlor inserts a provision into the trust instrument purporting to prohibit either or both Albert and Ben from further transferring their respective interests or terminating the trust within
the lifetime of Albert, the settlor still owns nothing. He disposed
of all that he had when he created the trust. But the American
concern for freedom of the human will led many of the American
courts to the conclusion that the settlor's wishes should be given
effect. If the instrument creating the trust expressly prohibited
the beneficiary from transferring his interest, that prohibition
was upheld. 17 The relationship became known as the "spendthrift trust." If the creating instrument expressly prohibited the
termination of the trust by the beneficiary or beneficiaries, that
prohibition was also upheld. 8 The relation created was an "indestructible trust," or as it is more popularly known, a "Claflin
trust." And both the spendthrift trust and the indestructible trust
were justified on the ground that their enforcement was necessary
to the carrying out of the human will, the human involved being
the settlor. The trusts were enforced even after the settlor was
dead and even if no living person could be found who desired
the enforcement. Thus, two separate, but somewhat related, doctrines were introduced into the law, the spendthrift trust and the
indestructible trust.
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This emphasis upon freedom of the will tended to obscure the
question, freedom of whose will? Was it the will of the living or
the will of the dead? Should control of the world's assets be in the
hands of the living generation or in the hands of some remote ancestor? Questions such as these were largely ignored in the 19 th
century, and the indestructible spendthrift trust became a reality.
It represented a strange, new concept in the law of trusts. It meant
that the sole beneficial owners of certain kinds of property interests were without power to sell, give away, or deal in the property
they owned. It meant that property owners who were sui juris and
not under any legal disability of any kind were nevertheless denied
the power to deal with one particular kind of property interest.
It meant that although absolute restraints on the alienation of
legal interests were prohibited, the same kind of restraints on
equitable interests were acceptable.
But the new doctrine was not universally accepted, 19 and to this
day there is much dispute as to its desirability. 20 The strange thing
is that while other jurisdictions were debating whether spendthrift trusts should be permitted, New York went all the way and
provided as early as 1830 that such trusts were required. The legislature accomplished this result by enacting a law that a beneficiary's right to receive income from a trust could not be transferred. 21 This meant that in our trust to pay income to Albert for
life with remainder to Ben, Albert was disabled from conveying
his interest whether the settlor imposed any such restriction or
not. Albert was given a valuable asset. He was sui juris in all other
respects. But as to this particular asset, this right to receive income
from a trust, Albert was disabled from making any disposition of
that interest.
The New York legislation making spendthrift trusts mandatory removed much of the settlor's freedom of choice in arranging
for his own estate plan, and at the same time imposed unnecessary
restraints on the further economic mobility of the assets being
transferred without regard to whether. or not the settlor or anyone else wanted such restraints. The paradoxical consequences of
the statute can be more fully appreciated when it is laid along
side of that other statutory provision which gave the settlor the
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power to revoke the trust and reclaim ownership in himself if he
22
had the consent of all persons beneficially interested. Just why
the settlor, who had at least theoretically parted with all incidents
of ownership, was given such a power has never been explained.
Neither has any good reason been offered as to why all persons
having a beneficial interest could not, by joining together, terminate the trust without consulting the settlor who had no beneficial interest. But since the statute expressly prohibited the income
beneficiary from alienating his interest, expressly provided a
means by which the settlor could revoke, and was silent as to any
power of revocation in the beneficiaries, it seemed reasonable to
assume that the income trust was necessarily indestructible unless
there was a live settlor who chose to make the first move.23 Thus,
New York found itself burdened, not only with a spendthrift
trust, but with a spendthrift trust that was also indestructible.
The Claflin doctrine was firmly established.
Such a restraint upon economic mobility necessarily raised new
questions of social policy concerning the duration of trusts, and
to a lesser extent the purposes for which trusts would be permitted. In the days when beneficiaries were free to convey their
respective interests and also free to join together in a termination
of the trust when they chose to do so, the trust itself had very little
tendency to tie up property. But when that power was taken away
from beneficiaries, a whole new problem was introduced.
The revisors apparently realized they were placing a severe restriction upon the mobility of accumulated wealth. They attempted to alleviate the condition they had created by restricting both
the duration and the purpose for which trusts could be created.
As to duration, there was no restriction upon the duration of
trusts as such. There was a provision that any transfer that suspended the power of alienation of real property 24 or the absolute
ownership of personalty 25 for more than two lives in being at the
creation of the interest was absolutely void. When these provisions were construed along with the spendthrift trust provisions,
the result was that any income trust that might extend for more
than two lives in being at the time of its creation was void. Within
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the context of the spendthrift trust, the two-lives rule did tend to
shorten the period within which property could be withheld from
commercial channels. To that extent, it did tend to promote economic mobility.
But the weakness of the two-lives rule was that it had no rational relation to the normal and reasonable wishes of heads of
families trying to provide for the natural objects of their bounties.
There is nothing abnormal or eccentric about a father's desire to
leave his fortune to a trustee to distribute income among his children until the death of the last child, and then distribute the corpus among his grandchildren. But neither was it easy to explain
to that father that such a plan would be acceptable so long as the
father had not more than two children, but that any time he went
over that limit his estate plan would fall apart. And any lawyer
who even tried to explain that rule to a client was likely to be
suspected of being some kind of a birth control nut-or maybe
just a nut.
But clients still had families for whom they wished to provide,
and lawyers were still being called upon to find ways to carry out
the clients' wishes. Clients with large families as well as those with
small families were knocking at the door of justice. And if justice
was really inside, the door had to open. The burden of finding
the appropriate key was upon the lawyer. And many keys were
found. There were the concurrent separable trusts, 26 the successive separable trusts, 27 and numerous others. Some plans worked
and some didn't. But the one thing most of them had in common
was that they were totally irrational except when they were seen
as efforts to fit reasonable family desires into the requirements of
an irrational statute. The result was that the making of a simple
will was more complicated and less likely to meet with success in
New York than in any other place in the world.28 By the time we
were trying to fit all that into an equally complicated estate tax
structure of the 193o's and 1940's, New York was probably the
only place in the world where it took more brains to transmit a
fortune from one generation to the next than it did to earn the
fortune in the first place.
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The solution seemed to be to bring the restrictive period into
harmony with the normal and natural desires of testators without
opening the door to an opportunity for the excessive tying up of
property. The common law perpetuities period of lives in being
plus twenty-one years had worked well in other jurisdictions. It
had worked well because it was a period that permitted a family
man to tie up his property for the lives of all his children, however many he might have, and at the same time withhold vesting
for the minority of any or all his grandchildren. Since very few
testators ever wanted to do more than that, even their failure to
understand the rule did not often lead to its violation.
The common law rule worked well in other jurisdictions but
would it work well in New York? The common law rule was really
a rule against remote vesting. But in New York we were concerned
about the duration of an indestructible spendthrift trust. Should
such a trust be permitted to endure for such a long period of time?
That was the problem that hindered New York reform for so
many years. There was much ferment throughout the 1950's. The
profession was searching for a way to avoid the artificiality of estate plans being demanded in those days. The first action came in
1958 when the two-lives rule was extended to include any number
of lives. 2 9 The effect was to end the discrimination against large
families. But the absence of any period in gross still hindered decedents in their efforts to withhold control from infant grandchildren during their age of indiscretion. That relief came only
two years later when the permitted period was further extended
to include a period of twenty-one years beyond lives in being,30
thereby making the permitted period for the suspension of the
power of alienation in New York identical with the permitted
period for the postponement of vesting under the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities.
By enlarging the permitted period for the suspension of the
power of alienation, the new legislation operated to enlarge the
permitted duration of the indestructible spendthrift trust. It was
a retreat away from the trend toward economic mobility. It expanded the time for the permitted tying up of property. To that
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extent, it might be looked upon as a surprise and even regrettable.
But it was a necessary step if we were to be done with the artificial
and unreal estate plans dictated by the two-lives rule. It also
added a degree of certainty which actually facilitated alienability
by making transfers more dependable.
Almost concurrently with the modifications of the rule against
the suspension of the power of alienation, significant changes
were being made in the statutory restrictions upon the accumulation of income. The legislation of 183o had prohibited all accumulations by trustees except during an actual minority and then
only for the benefit of the minor.31 Not only did this restriction
complicate efforts of estate planners to make sensible family arrangements in many situations; it made it unsafe to provide for
reserves for depreciation or to authorize trustees to make decisions as to what was income and what was principal. 3 2 These and
many other inconveniences were tolerated by New Yorkers until
the Internal Revenue Code made it possible to use the accumulation trust as a means of reducing the income tax burden.3 3 It then
became clear that the restrictive accumulation statutes were depriving New Yorkers of a tax advantage that was readily available
to taxpayers in other parts of the country. Such discrimination by
a state against its own citizens could not long endure. In 1959 the
old restrictions were abandoned. The permitted purpose for an
accumulation trust was expanded to include just about any purpose for which a trust could exist, and its permitted duration was
expanded to make it coextensive with the period allowed for the
34
suspension of the power of alienation.
The result of this legislation was that the suspension rule and
the accumulation rule were made harmonious with each other,
and both rules were made harmonious with the reasonable demands of family planning. Will drafting became easier. Families
consisting of more than two children no longer presented special
problems for the estate planner. Separable trusts, equitable
charges, and other unrealistic schemes were no longer needed.
More attention could be given to family needs and less to the
drafting of artificially contrived provisions designed to comply
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with restrictive rules that were unrelated to the needs of either
the family or the market. The legislature was doing a good job.
But problems did remain. The permitted period for the duration of an indestructible spendthrift trust had been expanded to
include a period measured by any number of lives plus twentyone years. And even the income from such a trust could be withheld from commerical channels for a like period. It seemed that
our commitment to the doctrine of economic mobility was being
forgotten. There had to be a missing link somewhere.
The missing link was soon found. The legislature discovered
what a number of commentators had known for a long time. It
was not the duration of the trust nor even the duration of the
period of income accumulation that kept property tied up in the
first place. It was the indestructible spendthrift nature of the trust
that did the harm. There was where reform was really needed.
The mandatory spendthrift trust, at least as to the beneficiary's
right to receive income, had been law in New York for well over
a hundred years. But in the 1950's more people than ever before
were asking why. And in 1964 a small dent was made in the spendthrift armor when the beneficiary was given a limited right to assign to members of his family that part of his trust income that
was in excess of $1 o,ooo. 5 In 1965 a limited right to invade principal was added. 6 And in 1973 the big event happened. The man37
datory spendthrift trust was actually abolished.
The spendthrift trust itself was not abolished; it merely ceased
to be mandatory. The old statute had provided that a beneficiary's
right to receive income was a non-transferable right. The new
statute provided that it was a non-transferable right unless the
settlor provided otherwise. The statute is an improvement over
what we had before, but it still leaves us with a substantial barrier
to free economic mobility. It is also a barrier that is completely
out of harmony with the public policy of New York as revealed
by its statutory trend for the past twenty-five years. As to all other
assets capable of being owned we presume freedom of alienation
unless a valid restriction is otherwise provided. But when it comes
to this one asset, this equitable estate for years or for life, the New
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York law now provides that it will be inalienable unless the settlor takes the trouble to tell us that it is alienable. We are left with
a peculiar rule applicable to a simple trust to provide income to
Albert for life with remainder to Ben. Albert's interest will be
inalienable unless the creating instrument makes it alienable.
Ben's interest will automatically be alienable unless the creating
instrument makes in inalienable.3 8 I assume that most of us would
agree that such inconsistency has little relevance to the settlor's
intent, and that the legislature should taken another look at that
just for the sake of harmony if nothing else.
And while we are looking for ways to harmonize two inconsistent rules, it might be wise to go further and consider the
possibility of eliminating the indestructible spendthrift trust
completely. There is a golden thread running through the legislative achievements of the past quarter-century, and that golden
thread is economic mobility. I have mentioned only a few of the
high points along the way. In addition to these there have been
numerous reforms of only slightly less magnitude. By way of illustration, the estate planner and draftsman has been relieved of
many of the old bugaboos associated with fertile octogenarians,
unborn widows, magic gravel pits, and similar strange beings. 39
And there have been others. Through it all the clear policy goal
has been to make the movement of wealth from one person to another or its transmittal from one generation to another just a
little easier.
The legislature has done its work well. But much of its effort
thus far has been directed toward the treatment of symptoms. The
time is now ripe to attack the disease itself. The disease is that
rule of law, or any rule of law, that enables the past generation to
dictate to the living generation the use to be made of the wealth
now in the world. It is the rule that separates ownership from responsibility even when owners are sui juris and capable of handling their own affairs.
A small step toward the cure of the disease was taken last year
when the mandatory nature of the spendthrift trust was eliminated. It is now time to reexamine the extent to which the indestruc-
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tible spendthrift trust should be permitted even when expressly
provided by the settlor. To what extent should a settlor who has
made a complete disposition of his assets be permitted to dictate
what future owners can do with those assets? To what extent
should control of and responsibility for property be separated
from its beneficial owners? To what extent should the wealth of
the world be controlled by the past rather than by the living generation? Can the evils of dead-hand control be eliminated while
some form of protective trusts or support trusts remain? These
are questions that are left unanswered by the twenty-five year
movement toward greater economic mobility that has just ended.
I suggest them as a starting point for the quarter-century immediately ahead.
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